Artikel von Prof. Kittsteiner in Management Science veröffentlicht


Der Artikel Contracting with Opportunistic Partners: Theory and Application to Technology Development and Innovation wurde von Management Science zur Veröffentlichung angenommen und online veröffentlicht. Der Artikel wurde von Thomas Kittsteiner (Lehrstuhl für Mikroökonomie) in Zusammenarbeit mit Pablo Casas-Arce (W. P. Carey School of Business, Arizona State University) und Asis Martinez-Jerez (University of Notre Dame) verfasst.



After a contract is signed, contracting partners may engage in  opportunistic behavior aimed at circumventing the original intention of  the agreement governing their business relationship, complying with the  letter but not the spirit of the contract. We use an incomplete  contracts approach to show that the anticipation and observability of  such behavior are typically not enough to prevent it when parties can  renegotiate contractual outcomes. This is because contractually  specified incentives inevitably have conflicting effects: they  simultaneously increase the likelihood of welfare-improving investments  and welfare-reducing opportunistic behavior. The possibility of such  opportunism thus limits the effectiveness of contractual incentives. We  also discuss how our results relate to contracting practices observed in  industries characterized by rapid innovation, such as information  technology.